Supreme Court Judgment • Public Interest Litigation
Supreme Court Dismisses Padmavati PIL by M L Sharma, Cautions Against Improper Pleadings
The Supreme Court of India dismissed a public interest litigation filed by advocate Manohar Lal Sharma concerning the film Padmavati. In its judgment dated 28 November 2017, the Court declined to interfere with the pending film-certification process or direct registration of a criminal case, and cautioned the petitioner about the language and content of his pleadings.
Case: Manohar Lal Sharma v. Sanjay Leela Bhansali & Others
Case number: Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 191 of 2017
Decision: 28 November 2017
Bench: Chief Justice Dipak Misra, Justice A. M. Khanwilkar and Justice D. Y. Chandrachud
Outcome: Petition dismissed; specified pleadings struck off; no costs imposed
Background and Reliefs Sought in the PIL
The petitioner invoked Article 32 of the Constitution and sought, first, to prevent the film from being exhibited outside India without the requisite certificate from the Central Board of Film Certification (CBFC) under the Cinematograph Act, 1952. Second, he sought a writ of mandamus directing the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) to register an FIR against filmmaker Sanjay Leela Bhansali and others and investigate alleged offences.
The petition referred to Section 7 of the Cinematograph Act, 1952, Sections 153A, 295, 295A, 499 and 500 of the then-applicable Indian Penal Code, 1860, and Section 4 of the Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act, 1986. These references describe the petitioner's allegations, not findings that any offence had occurred.
Supreme Court's Observations on Pleadings
The Bench strongly criticised the language and allegations in the petition, stressing that court pleadings must be precise, relevant and respectful. It recalled that in the petitioner's earlier W.P. (Criminal) No. 186 of 2017, the Court had already disapproved similar pleadings and struck out substantial portions.
In the present proceedings, the Court directed that the narrations on pages B to E be struck off the record and not repeated elsewhere. It rejected the suggestion that the impugned narrative did not form part of the pleadings.
Why the Court Refused to Interfere with CBFC Certification
At the time, the film's certification application was pending before the CBFC. The Court reiterated its earlier view that judicial comments on the film before the statutory authority completed its consideration would amount to prejudging the matter. It expected the CBFC to act objectively in accordance with the governing law, rules and guidelines.
The Court also found no sufficient basis to order registration of an FIR on the allegations made in the petition. The dismissal did not amount to a judicial determination that the film had already been certified.
No Costs Imposed, but Petitioner Cautioned
Although the Court indicated that the petition and its pleadings ordinarily warranted costs, it refrained from imposing them because the petitioner-in-person was a practising advocate before the Supreme Court. It expressly cautioned him to be careful in future.
The judgment warned against misuse of public interest litigation for publicity or other improper motives and emphasised that PIL proceedings cannot be used to make scurrilous or vexatious allegations against others.
Legal Provisions Explained
Article 32 of the Constitution of India
Article 32 guarantees the right to approach the Supreme Court for enforcement of fundamental rights and empowers the Court to issue appropriate directions, orders and writs. A public interest petition under Article 32 must still satisfy the applicable requirements of maintainability and judicial scrutiny.
Cinematograph Act, 1952 and Section 7
The Cinematograph Act, 1952 governs certification of films for public exhibition in India. Section 7 contains penal provisions for specified contraventions of the Act. The precise statutory elements and penalties must be assessed under the version of the Act applicable to the relevant conduct.
Indian Penal Code provisions cited in the 2017 petition
Section 153A addressed promotion of enmity between groups; Section 295 addressed injuring or defiling a place of worship or sacred object with the requisite intent; Section 295A addressed deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings; Section 499 defined defamation; and Section 500 prescribed punishment for defamation. These were historical IPC provisions cited in the 2017 litigation.
Section 4 of the Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act, 1986
Section 4 restricts the production, sale, distribution, circulation and related dealings in certain materials containing indecent representation of women, subject to statutory exceptions. Its mention in the petition did not establish a contravention.
Current Legal Position: Changes Since the 2017 Judgment
The Cinematograph (Amendment) Act, 2023 amended the film-certification framework, and the Cinematograph (Certification) Rules, 2024 replaced the 1983 certification rules. The current statutory framework and certification guidance are available from the Central Board of Film Certification and the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting.
The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 came into force on 1 July 2024 and replaced the Indian Penal Code for offences governed by the new law, subject to applicable savings and transitional provisions. References to IPC sections above are retained because they formed part of the 2017 case. The subsequent legislation does not retrospectively change what the Supreme Court decided in this judgment.
For updated official material, consult the CBFC film certification process and the Government of India's announcement of the 2024 certification rules.
Significance of the Judgment
The ruling illustrates two procedural principles: courts ordinarily avoid prejudging a decision entrusted to a statutory certification authority while its process is pending, and public interest litigation does not excuse careless, abusive or unsupported pleadings. It also demonstrates that the Supreme Court may strike objectionable material from a petition while declining to impose monetary costs.